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PANEL III: Trademark Dilution and Its
Effects on the Marks of Big
and Small Business
Moderator: Hugh C. Hansen *
Panelists: Barton Beebe †
Dennis McCooe ‡
Eric A. Prager §
MR. RIZZO: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name
is Anthony Rizzo. I’m the Symposium Editor for the journal this
year.
I hope you have enjoyed the Symposium and all the panels so
far. If this is your first one today, welcome. It will be a good one.
This is our final panel. It deals with trademark dilution and its
effects on businesses, both large and small.
It’s my pleasure and honor to introduce the panel moderator
today, Professor Hugh Hansen. He is a professor of IP here at
Fordham, teaching copyright, trademark, European IP law, and
advanced copyright. He is also the director and driving force
behind the Fordham International IP Conference, which this year is
going on its seventeenth year and, for the first time, will be taking
place in Cambridge, England. I welcome you all to look into that.
With that, I give you Professor Hansen.
PROF. HANSEN: Thank you, Anthony. You’ve done a great
job as Symposium Editor putting this together. It has been

A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/
volumexix/book4. Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive.
*
Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
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‡
Blank Rome, LLP.
§
Partner, K&L Gates.
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excellent up to now. Hopefully, we can maintain those standards
here.
By the way, it’s Fordham’s Seventeenth Annual Intellectual
Property Law and Policy Conference we are putting on in
Cambridge. My motto is, “Be there or be square.” Now we
wouldn’t want anyone to be square.
We have a great panel. Their biographies are in the materials.
I’ll just briefly give identifying information.
To my immediate left is Barton Beebe. Even though he has
only been in the teaching profession a little while, he has already
become a star. He’s teaching at NYU, visiting, and I think second
semester, he is visiting at Stanford.
He has done empirical work both in copyright and trademark
law. This type of work is rare but it’s very valuable and
interesting.
Dennis McCooe is with Blank Rome in Philadelphia. He is an
IP lawyer. He litigates in federal and state courts. He does
licensing prosecution and represents a number of clients, big and
small. We are happy to have him here.
Finally, but not least, is Eric Prager. He is now a partner at
K&L Gates. Eric when he was at Fordham Law School was the
Editor-in-Chief of the IPLJ, which was then called the Intellectual
Property Law Forum. He also worked on a couple of WIPO
treaties, helping out the Finnish director of those diplomatic
conferences. He was with Darby & Darby for many years, until he
recently moved to K&L Gates.
I think we were going to start out with Dennis.
MR. MCCOOE: Before we start, Barton is going to give a fiveminute or so overview of where we are right now. We have a
newly enacted statute the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, which
we are going to call today the TDRA. 1 That came into place
approximately a year and a half ago—I guess it’s coming up on

1
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (West Supp. 2008)).
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two years. 2 So we have an opportunity, especially with Barton’s
empirical evidence, to examine a little where we are right now, two
years after. It’s still quite early, but the results are in. They don’t
look too good.
PROF. BEEBE: Thanks.
Dennis is absolutely correct. The effective date of the new
TDRA was October 6, 2006, 3 so the autumn is always a poignant
time for trademark scholars, because it marks the new year for the
TDRA and also for looking back over the past year of TDRA case
law.
I’m going to try, in five minutes—which is impossible—to
give you a quick overview of the antidilution cause of action itself,
in case some of you are unfamiliar with it. Those of you who are
familiar with it will probably find mistakes in what I’m saying.
But hopefully it will just be a quick version of events, based on the
initial theory of Frank Schecter from 1927. Then I will very
briefly tell you about the old FTDA, Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995, 4 which was then revised by the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2006. 5
The dilution concept itself was sort of founded by a fellow
named Frank Schechter, a New Yorker, a lawyer for BVD
Underwear Company, in the 1920s. 6 He wrote an incredibly
influential article in Harvard Law Review called “The Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection,” published in 1927. 7 There he
recognized what was absolutely correct for the time, at least as far
as we can tell, looking back. It was that the anti-confusion cause

2

Id.; see 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24:96 (4th ed. 2009).
3
See MCCARTHY, supra note 2.
4
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125).
5
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125).
6
M.J. Alexander, T.H. Davis Jr., & L.T. Estrin, The Historic Foundation of the
Dilution Doctrine in Trademark Law, WORLDEXTRA: INTA SUPPLEMENT, May 2008, at
10, http://static.informaprofessional.com/ipwo/images/supplements/INTA_May08.pdf.
7
Frank I. Schechter, A Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813 (1927).
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of action was fairly limited. 8 It did not reach certain conduct that
would nevertheless harm a company’s trademark. 9 A classic
example might be the Rolls-Royce brand name, Rolls-Royce for
automobiles, and then suddenly Rolls-Royce, let’s say, begins to
appear on chewing gum or on shoes or chairs or doorknobs or
something else along those lines. 10
Under the anti-confusion doctrine of the 1920s, that conduct—
Rolls-Royce on doorknobs—could not be reached by an anticonfusion cause of action, because the courts would assume that
consumers were not confused as to the true source of those
doorknobs or that chewing gum or something else. 11 So there was
no consumer confusion, and therefore no action would lie on the
basis of consumer confusion. 12
Another version of events is to say that there is no diversion of
trade caused by Rolls-Royce doorknobs. Rolls-Royce was still
selling its automobiles. They weren’t selling doorknobs. So it’s
not as though some other company was coming along and stealing
their sales in doorknobs.
Schecter said, still, there is a harm to the Rolls-Royce
trademark. 13 It’s not consumer confusion; it’s something else. The
harm is damage to the mark’s “selling power.” 14 That was one of
Schecter’s terms. The other was “damage to the distinctiveness”
8

Id. at 821–25.
Id. at 825–31.
[T]he law, even in its most liberal interpretation at the present time,
will prevent the misuse of that mark only where there is an actual
confusion created by such misuse, resulting in either diversion of
trade or other concrete financial liability or injury to trade repute.
However, we have intimated the possibility that the use of trademarks
on entirely non-related goods may of itself concretely injure the
owner of the mark even in the absence of those elements of damage
noted above.
Id. at 825.
10
See id. at 829–30.
11
See id. at 830.
12
Id. at 824 (“[T]he rule [is] that a trademark or trade-name is only coextensive with
its use and may be used by different firms in different localities.”).
13
Id. at 825, 830.
14
Schecter, supra note 7, at 830 (“This entirely arbitrary symbol would soon lose its
arresting uniqueness and hence its selling power . . . .”). Schecter also stated that the
value of the modern trademark lies in its selling power. See id. at 831.
9
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of the mark. 15 The mark was no longer unique in the marketplace.
It no longer referred uniquely to one category of goods. Instead, it
started referring to all sorts of other goods. Imagine a mark like
“Acme” or “Merit” or “Broadway.” When you hear those marks,
you don’t necessarily know to which goods they refer. They are
very sort of bland trademarks. They have no selling power, no
advertising value. It was this that Schecter wanted to protect with
an antidilution cause of action. 16
So he started advocating for this antidilution cause of action,
with more or less success, at least at the state level. Through the
course of the postwar period, various states began to adopt
antidilution statutory sections at the state level. 17 Then in 1995,
we had the first federal antidilution cause of action provided to us
by the new section 43(c) of the Lanham Act—43(c), which we
otherwise used to call the FTDA, Federal Trademark Dilution
Act. 18
The FTDA was, to quote the poet Ezra Pound in commenting
on European civilization, “wrong from the start.” 19 It was a
15

See Schecter, supra note 7, at 831.
[S]elling power depends . . . upon its own uniqueness and singularity
. . . [and] such uniqueness or singularity is vitiated or impaired by its
use upon either related or non-related goods [and] . . . the degree of
its protection depends in turn upon the extent to which, through the
efforts or ingenuity of its owner, it is actually unique and different
from other marks.
Id. Although he does not specifically mention an antidilution cause of action, Schecter’s
argument was that dilution of a mark damages the selling power of a particular product,
which entitles the mark owner to damages. See generally id.
16
Id. at 831 (“[T]he preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute
the only rational basis for its protection . . . .”).
17
U.S. State Dilution Law Subcommittee, INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION,
U.S. State Dilution Laws 2 (2004), http://www.inta.org/membersonly/downloads/
ref_state.pdf (“Of the fifty states in the United States, over two-thirds of them have some
form of dilution statute. The first state to pass a dilution statute was Massachusetts in
1947, followed by Illinois in 1953. . . .” (citations omitted)). See, e.g., Trademark
Registration and Protection Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1036/65 (2009).
18
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (West Supp. 2008)).
19
See Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1152 (2006) [hereinafter Beebe, A
Defense] (“An idiosyncratic draft hurriedly enacted into law, the FTDA was wrong from
the start.”).
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disaster. Clarisa Long, uptown, has done lots of interesting work
about FTDA case law, showing the degree to which either courts
were hostile to FTDA causes of action or otherwise they just
weren’t working. 20 You see over time a decreasing proportion of
injunctions being issued in cases in which an FTDA antidilution
cause of action was brought. 21
I won’t tell you too much about the FTDA’s actual provisions,
because now we have the TDRA. What I’ll tell you instead is what
is new about the Trademark Dilution Revision Act.
The TDRA was passed into law in 2006. October 6 was its
effective date, as I mentioned. We have a bunch of very important
innovations in the TDRA.
The first one, and I think probably the most important, would
be the establishment of a likelihood-of-dilution standard. 22 The
FTDA was interpreted to establish an actual dilution standard by
the Supreme Court opinion Moseley v. V Secret 23 in 2003. This
was a very controversial outcome. The trademark bar, at least for
big trademark owners, was horrified that there was read into the
Act an actual dilution standard, very hard to meet. One of the
main reasons we have the TDRA is to override the Supreme Court
opinion in Moseley. That’s the first and most important innovation
of the new Act.
Secondly, going to the Second Circuit, in particular, the Act
explicitly establishes that both inherently distinctive and non20

See generally Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (2006) (analyzing
the dilution cause of action and the effectiveness of the FTDA).
21
Id. at 1042 (“The results show that the rate at which trademark holders have been
able to get injunctive relief on their dilution claims in district court has been dropping
over time from an initial success rate of 54.17% in 1996 to 12.00% for the first half of
2005.”).
22
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730,
1730–32 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)); see Beebe, A Defense, supra
note 19, at 1156 (“[M]ost importantly, the TDRA provides that the plaintiff need merely
show a likelihood of dilution in order to gain relief under Section 43(c) . . . .”).
23
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432–33 (2003).
“[T]he owner of a famous mark” is entitled to injunctive relief
against another person’s commercial use of a mark or trade name if
that use “causes dilution of the distinctive quality” of the famous
mark.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)).
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inherently distinctive marks may receive antidilution protection at
the federal level. 24 To make a long story very short, in the Second
Circuit, primarily because of the intervention of some opinions by
Judge Leval, there was a line of doctrine saying that a noninherently distinctive mark, such as British Airways, United Van
Lines, United Airlines, could not receive antidilution protection. 25
Furthermore, we interpret the TDRA to reject the doctrine of
niche fame, which I think will come up later on. I will just say that
there is language in the TDRA, which we can quote later on, that
rejects the concept of niche fame. 26 In order to qualify for
antidilution protection at the federal level, you have to show that
your mark is widely recognized by the general consuming public
of the United States. 27
Just a few more and then I’ll conclude.
The TDRA also reconfigures the fame factors. If you are
familiar with the FTDA, the old law, you will know that there are
A-through-H factors for figuring out fame. 28 It’s a crazy list. It
was very mechanical. Now we have four factors, I suppose, for
determining fame. 29
24

Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)) (the Act gives protection for marks that are inherently distinctive and marks that
have acquired distinctiveness); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976). The court stated that “§ 2(e) of the Lanham Act . . . [only]
forbids the registration of a mark which, when applied to the goods of the applicant, is
‘merely descriptive,’” and that any other marks will be afforded trademark protection. Id.
25
See TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Commc’ns., Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir.
2001) (“[I]t is the policy of the Act to grant broader protection to those marks with a
higher degree of inherent distinctiveness.”); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d
208, 227–28 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A mark can be famous without being at all distinctive, as in
the [case] of . . . British Airways . . . .”).
26
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(2)(A)); see Beebe, A Defense, supra note 19, at 1156 (“It [the TDRA] rejects the
doctrine of ‘niche fame.’”).
27
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (“[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or
services of the mark’s owner.”).
28
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 104 Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat.
985, 985–86 (1996) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)) (amending the
remedies offered for trademark dilution and listing factors (c)(1)(A)–(H) to be
considered).
29
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2(c)(2)(A) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)).
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Another innovation, probably much more important, was that,
finally, the act, the new TDRA, explicitly defines “blurring” 30 and
“tarnishment,” 31 two concepts which we can talk about later on.
Maybe in the interest of introductory comments—I don’t want
to go on too long—
PROF. HANSEN: It’s fine. We have plenty of time.
PROF. BEEBE: I’ll read out the two definitions of “blurring”
and “tarnishment,” to give you a sense of what these forms of
dilution are. So these are two sub-forms of the general concept of
dilution. 32
The Act defines dilution by blurring as the following:
“[D]ilution by blurring is association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark.” 33 In other words, it is
association arising from similarity that impairs the distinctiveness
of the famous mark.
As we might end up talking about, there is some interesting
case law just lately where the courts have parsed out this definition
to almost write it out of the Act. There is the Charbucks 34 case
lately, and then the V Secret case on remand back to the district
court 35 is a beautiful example of how to read this Act out of
existence. 36
30
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 1210 Stat.
1730, 1730–33 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)); see text
accompanying infra notes 33–37.
31
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(2)(C)) (“‘Dilution by tarnishment’ is association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous
mark.”).
32
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:67 (“A weakening or reduction in the ability of a
mark to clearly distinguish only one source [i.e., dilution] can occur in two different
dimensions: ‘blurring’ and ‘tarnishment.’”).
33
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(2)(B)).
34
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
35
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 744–45 (W.D. Ky. 2008)
36
Starbucks Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d at 476–78, 481 (discussing the TDRA’s
modifications to the PTDA, but nevertheless finding plaintiff still failed to meet its
burden); V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d at 744–45 (“The marks in issue must
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Dilution by blurring, I think, is seen as the mainstream version
of dilution. This is the idea that the link between the trademark
and the products to which it is typically affixed is blurred by the
appearance of that trademark on all sorts of other products in the
marketplace. With “United,” you have to think for a moment, goes
the doctrine, before you know if it’s United Van Lines or United
Airlines. Judge Posner has referred to this as “imagination costs” 37
to the consumer caused by the blurring of a mark’s—I think the
concept in marketing is “brand typicality.”
“‘[D]ilution by tarnishment’ is association arising from the
similarity between a mark or a trade name and a famous mark that
harms the reputation of the famous mark.” 38 Thus, it is association
arising from similarity that harms the reputation of the famous
mark. I suppose “tarnishment” is a much more intuitive concept.
We have good Second Circuit case law, like the old John
Deere 39 case, if you are familiar with that, talking about
tarnishment. 40
A few more points about what’s new—just two more.
The new Act sets forth six factors for determining whether
blurring has occurred. 41 This is new. We had no good doctrine in
the federal courts about what factors should be considered for
blurring. We had the Second Circuit sometimes telling us two
factors: similarity of the marks and strength of the plaintiff’s mark.
Then we had the Second Circuit in Nabisco v. PF 42 giving us this
be ‘identical’ or ‘nearly identical’ or ‘substantially similar.’ While the TDRA does not
require that the marks be ‘identical’ or ‘nearly identical,’ it does not appear that the Act
eliminated this requirement previously established in the law.”).
37
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002).
But when consumers next see the name “Tiffany” they may think
about both the restaurant and the jewelry store, and if so the efficacy
of the name as an identifier of the store will be diminished.
Consumers will have to think harder—incur as it were a higher
imagination cost—to recognize the name as the name of the store.
Id. (citing Exxon Corp. v. Exxene Corp., 696 F.2d 544, 549–50 (7th Cir. 1982)).
38
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2008).
39
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1977).
40
Id. at 42–44.
41
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 1210 Stat.
1730, 1731 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i–vi)).
42
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).

VOL19_BOOK4_TRADEMARK PANEL

1034

11/16/2009 6:47:06 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:1025

amazing long list of factors that was an expansion of the “Sweet
factors” that had been applied under state law. 43
So it was just a real mess. Trademark purists would say that
most of the Nabisco factors, as they were called in the Second
Circuit, were just confusion factors. One had the impression that
the opinion responsible for those factors just didn’t understand that
there was a difference between infringement and dilution.
But now we have, I think, good, sensible factors in the TDRA.
Finally, probably, from the perspective of some trademark
scholarship, the single most important aspect of the Act is that it
expands the exclusions—I guess they are called exclusions—from
trademark protection, going to fair use of a trademark, parody,
criticism, commentary, news reporting, that sort of thing. 44 I’m
not sure we are going to talk that much about that today.
So that’s a quick overview. Now I think I’ll turn it over to
Dennis.
PROF. HANSEN: Hold on a second. Let me just add a few
things by way of a continuing introduction.
Barton, you say Frank Schecter’s article was highly
influential. 45 This is certainly the traditional and widely accepted
view. I actually don’t think it was that influential. It took twentyseven years before any state even tried to do it, and what they did
had, really, almost nothing to do with what Frank Schecter wanted.
He wanted to protect the big important national marks and the state
laws protected any mark that was “distinctive” or strong in state
and local contexts. As academics we naturally seek to explain the
derivation of things and go back to find them. Schecter’s article
fits nicely into that search. And as I said, Barton’s explanation is
the traditional and fully accepted one. But I’m not sure that that
article had a lot of practical, real-world effect on the passage or
interpretation of state dilution laws.

43

Id. at 227–28.
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(3)).
45
See supra text accompanying note 7.
44
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The early state law was mostly interpreted by federal court as a
result of supplementary jurisdictions in federal trademark
infringement actions. The federal judges were initially hostile to
the state dilution claims and regularly read into the statutes the
need for likelihood of confusion and also competition between the
parties. This was a de facto preemption of the state laws by
imposing federal trademark infringement policy onto them. It
wasn’t until a 1977 New York Court of Appeals decision, Allied
Maintenance, 46 said for all seven judges, “Hold on. The New
York dilution provision says what it says it says. You don’t have
to have likelihood of confusion or competition.” 47 Judge Cooke,
later Chief Judge Cooke, along with Chief Judge Breital and Judge
Wachtler agreed with the majority on the lack of need for
confusion or competition but disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion that the mark “Allied Maintenance” was not strong
enough to invoke protection against dilution.
There followed a body of law which started giving, I think,
fairly serious protection considering it was difficult for many
courts and others to get their minds around the concept.
As for the proposed Federal Trademark Dilution Act, nobody
was really crying out for a federal dilution law, other than INTA—
formerly the USTA. But I think international consideration came
into play in its final passage. The proposed FTDA had not yet
been passed and its prospects were not improving. Around this
time the U.S. Trade Representative was going around the world
and saying, “You have to protect internationally famous marks in
your country” which were supposed to be protected even before
they were actually used in the country. Countries responded,
“Well, you don’t protect famous marks in your country. You have
no law that protects famous marks.” The USTR said, “Well, we
have some state case law.”
It was mostly New York
misappropriation law. That answer did not resonate with these
countries. But then, lo and behold, the proposed FTDA used the
expression “famous marks.” It was actually for dilution purposes
46

Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 546–50 (N.Y.
1977).
47
Id. at 546–50 (Cooke, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s application of
the statute and proposing a different method of analysis).
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and not to protect internationally famous marks not yet used in the
U.S. But it was a federal statute that protected famous marks. It
went through the respective committees without any further
discussion or much notice anyway else, and shot through
Congress. It surprised almost everybody.
After the FTDA was enacted courts didn’t treat the new created
federal dilution much differently from how they treated dilution
under state law. The big exception was Judge Leval’s bizarre
decision in Haar 48 which held that under the FTDA marks with
acquired distinctiveness were not eligible for federal protection.
And then the Supreme Court in the Victoria’s Secret case 49 held
that the FTDA statutory language which only called for “dilution,”
rather than “likelihood of dilution” in the state laws, needed to be
given effect and, thus, plaintiffs need to prove “actual dilution.”
These two changes in the status quo led to the federal Trademark
Dilution Revision Act.
This leads us back to Dennis.
MR. MCCOOE: Thank you, Professor Hansen.
As Professor Beebe noted in his recent article and as I alluded
to at the outset, we have two years now of results, and it doesn’t
look good. In fact—I don’t remember the exact title of Barton’s
article—the word “debacle” is used. 50 That’s a fairly accurate way
of describing what has been going on.
I will just give you a couple of quick insights in Professor’s
Beebe’s article.
He highlights that the following marks were actually found to
be famous; see how many you can identify: DVF, Pet Silk, the
color combination of scarlet and black, Rustic Ledge, Cliffstone,
and my favorite, Pycnogenol. 51

48

TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001).
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
50
Barton Beebe, Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the
First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, The Symposium Review, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449 (2008) [hereinafter Beebe, Continuing
Debacle].
51
Id. at 466.
49
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Now, let’s keep in mind what Barton said before, which is that
one of the most significant changes to the law was to introduce a
standard that niche fame would not suffice and that you would
have to show that the marks were widely recognized by the
consuming general public in the United States. What we see here
is that someone is not reading the Act. Congress intended that the
Act would resolve discrepancies, that it would reduce lack of
understanding, that it would lead to clarity. We can see that, if
these marks are famous, something is amiss.
At the very least, what we see is that from the first two years,
someone is either misapplying the law, someone is not reading the
law, or we are seeing what the other professor has described today
as hostility on the part of the courts to the whole notion of dilution.
Two marks that have also been found to be famous in the most
recent cases that you will recognize are Nike 52 and Qwest. In the
Qwest 53 case, it’s interesting to note that, like a lot of the other
cases previously, the issue of whether the mark was being diluted
didn’t even come up, because the court found there was
confusion. 54 So they didn’t even reach the issue of dilution.
So courts are not treating these as if they are, in fact, separate
causes of action. They see them as alternative causes of action. If
you reach one, they don’t bother going on to the other. They are
obviously much more familiar, much more comfortable dealing in
issues of likelihood of confusion, and so they start there.
It’s also true that the attorneys who bring these cases, and the
clients, are much more comfortable in the likelihood-of-confusion
regime, and the whole test of whether a mark is famous to begin
with, as a threshold matter, is one that people would just as soon
choose to avoid.
You are going to hear from Eric about the view from the large
corporate perspective. Obviously, there are some truly distinctive
famous marks in the United States, and they, under at least a
theory, should be protected. But from a small company’s
standpoint, what we see is that the new TDRA has not achieved its
52
53
54

Nike v. Nikepal, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1820 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
Qwest Commc’ns Int’l v. Cyber-Quest, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d. 297 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
Id.
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purpose. If, in fact, Congress intended that it would cure some of
the problems that were found in the prior Act—I believe the
Judiciary Committee said that the application of the FTDA
suffered from a lack of uniformity, which complicated the ability
of mark holders to protect their property, and businesses to plan
their commercial affairs.
The idea of protecting the rights of mark holders—
theoretically, all those tools are there. But the second issue of
whether businesses can plan their commercial affairs—what we
see is that this Act has not been very successful in that regard. As
a small-company mark holder or as a company that does not own a
famous mark, what typically happens, in my experience, is that in a
case—for example, BVD, an underwear company. 55 If BVD is the
owner of a famous mark, which arguably it might be, as opposed to
DVF—I don’t know what DVF makes; 56 I’ve never heard of it—
BVD is a relatively famous mark. If I’m the manufacturer of
alternative clothing and I have the same initials—it might be the
name of my mother; it might be BV, Beverly Victoria—maybe that
was a concocted theory, but if I sell clothing under the BV name,
am I going to be diluting the BVD mark?
Certainly, if I’m selling clothing, underwear, ladies’ garments,
and the like, there is certainly a case that could be made that that is
going to cause confusion. We can agree about that. Whether the
jury finds it’s confusing is another matter. But from the standpoint
of trying to anticipate, as a small company, whether there is going
to be some dilution implication from my actions, it’s impossible,
under this recent test, to really say. What we see is that there are
factors for fame. BVD may make it over the threshold there; it
may not. But what we can’t say, from a small company’s
standpoint, is whether or not I’m going to be sued for this type of
cause of action.
The costs of that are significant. As a mark holder, I can rest
assured of one thing: as a small company, unless I have a

55

Fruit of the Loom—BVD, http://www.bvdapparel.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
DVF is the “global luxury lifestyle brand” of clothing designer Diane von
Furstenberg. Diane von Furstenberg—About, http://inside.dvf.com/about/the_company
(last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
56
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particularly strong product, I’m not likely to have a famous mark.
Under the new Act, these other marks aside—Pet Silk and Rustic
Ledge—it’s very unlikely that a company can make out a claim for
nationwide fame among the general consuming public, unless, in
fact, you are selling masses of goods. For the most part, what we
are going to see is that consumer products, and almost exclusively
consumer products, are going to be considered famous marks. So
if you are a major player in the software field, but you are only
famous amongst people who buy that particular brand of, say,
database-management tool, that’s not a famous mark under the
Act. It could be famous to everybody that cares about it, but it’s
not going to be famous. You can’t dilute other people’s marks
with that kind of a mark.
What we have, from a small company’s standpoint, is that, first
of all, I don’t really qualify. Then the second side of it is that with
a lesser standard, the likelihood-of-dilution standard, as opposed to
the more absolute standard of actual dilution, what we are going to
see is that, in theory at least, it will be far easier for a big company
to prevail on a claim that its mark is being diluted by my
alternative use in a different product area, in a different niche, as it
were.
So the implications for the small company might sound drastic.
They might sound like it’s going to be a far crueler world. But
what I think we are going to see, in fact, is that the hostility that
has been evidenced so far, that has been historically dogging
dilution, will continue to come into play.
Barton’s article was interesting. Although it’s only two years
old, there were several cases in which the court was purporting to
actually follow the Act, and somewhere through it—and I assume
it was in bad briefing on the part of the lawyers—the opinions
reflect that the judge was applying the old act or was applying state
dilution acts.
I don’t know how that could happen. I assume that law clerks
actually check the law; they don’t just accept what the lawyers put
in their briefs. But apparently it’s not always the case.
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We do have a new body of law. We do have a new Act, which
has its own very specific principles and it has its own standards.
We should expect that those will be followed.
But what I expect and what I have seen in the last two years is
that it is business as usual. I have yet to see a case, in about
twenty-five or so cases that we have had in the last several years,
in which there is a single dilution count that is not also coupled
with a cause of action of likelihood of confusion. It’s just partly
reflective of the fact that there are, truly, very few famous marks.
But my experience tells me that the fact that they are also brought
in other causes of action where there is a typical Lanham Act claim
for likelihood of confusion is reflective of the fact that people,
especially lawyers, guided only by Rule 11, 57 which means they
have to make sure that it passes the straight-face test, would bring
in a dilution cause of action if it’s even marginally possible to
bring that cause of action.
The courts, then, read it right out. If they meet the likelihoodof-confusion case, which is probably sufficient in about ninety-five
percent of the cases, then they never get to the issue of dilution.
There is no extra remedy available. There are no extra attorneys’
fees. It’s not like the Copyright Act that gives attorneys’ fees in
many instances. In trademark law, you have to show that a case is
exceptional. Given the confusion—and I use that word carefully—
given the confusion about dilution, I think that it’s very difficult, if
not impossible, to show that somebody was intending, in most
instances, to cause the blurring or tarnishment.
We may touch on rights of free speech and fair use later on.
There are cases in which people are purposely trying to make a
parody. Those are typically the kinds of cases where you do see a
lot of distinctive causes of action for dilution. But in the lion’s
share of all the cases that I have seen, what we see is that it’s just a
throw-in, one more cause of action, along with common law and
fair competition. If you are in New York particularly, you are
going to see the state dilution cause of action. This is the state
with, certainly, the biggest body of law, ever since the Allied
57
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (setting standards which all cases must meet and sanctions for
lawyers who violate those standards).
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case. 58 There is a well-established standard. There is a wellestablished body of cases that you can look to. You can look for
cases with similar facts. You can look for good judgments that
have been issued, with clear rulings.
In reality, in those states—and about forty of the fifty states
have state causes of action for dilution—that is essentially the only
role that can be played offensively by a small company, to seek out
a state cause of action. They will be foreclosed in almost all cases
in pursuing under the TDRA, but the state cause of action provides
an alternative. The standard is, again, likelihood of dilution, and
niche fame is all that’s required. In New York you would have to
show that the mark is famous in New York, and not necessarily
amongst all New Yorkers, but you could show that your own
company is quite famous in the area of database management or
ladies’ undergarments or what have you in New York. In theory, it
wouldn’t have to be across the entire state of New York. You can
slice it and dice it all you want. It’s a matter of what the judge
might say.
I don’t know how far the cases have gone in that regard. But in
theory, in a smaller state like New Jersey, you could achieve a
relative degree of fame sufficient to make out a cause of action for
dilution. The courts in New Jersey will not be particularly
welcoming to it. In Pennsylvania, where I practice frequently,
there are almost no dilution cases. The courts just never reach the
issue. The state cause of action has almost no opinions on it.
When I’m writing a case on state dilution, I will look at New York,
invariably, to see how they have interpreted a very similar statute.
That’s where we are right now. I think Eric is going to give
you a perspective on what the big company sees in this Act. I
think it’s a somewhat brighter picture. But again, it’s too early to
tell.

58
Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 546–50 (N.Y.
1977); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multi-factor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1594–95 (2006) [hereinafter Beebe, An Empirical
Study] (“[T]he district courts of the Second Circuit contributed a large plurality of
opinions to the sample, producing nearly one-third of the total opinions and nearly onehalf of the bench trial opinions.”).
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MR. PRAGER: Good afternoon. I want to be very clear that I
like small companies, too.
From my perspective, what I want to observe in the Act is that
I don’t see this as necessarily a bad Act for small companies. In
fact, I think there are some things that the TDRA makes clear that
were less clear in the FTDA—or under state law, for that matter—
that are of benefit to anybody who is a defendant, for example.
On the plaintiff’s side, it’s certainly the case, I think, that the
TDRA makes things a lot more difficult for small companies. The
reason for that—we have been throwing around the term “niche
fame.” I don’t know if everyone is familiar with the concept. The
idea behind it is that you can be very famous in a narrow niche, but
the broader universe has no idea who you are.
I’m trying to think of a good example. In the database
management example, I don’t know if Oracle is a famous brand on
the order of Rolls-Royce, but it’s certainly famous to anybody who
works with business software applications.
By eliminating the idea of niche fame in the TDRA, you have a
situation where there are going to be very few companies that are
going to have enough marketing wherewithal, enough distribution,
to develop what the Act considers fame now. That makes it hard
for a small company to be famous, unless they are going to be
niche-famous, and niche fame isn’t available under the Federal
Act.
I’m not sure that’s necessarily a bad thing. This is a Federal
Act. As a federal republic, we have lots of situations where states
enact greater protection than is available at the federal level,
because they want to protect their citizens.59 So I don’t find that to
be a terribly compelling—I don’t know that it’s the case that every
little company has to have federal protection. I think a principled
legislator could say, at the federal level, this is only for the really
big marks. Reasonable minds could differ about that.

59

See U.S. PIRG, Strong State Laws, http://uspirg.org/uspirg.asp?id2=17742
(discussing why strong state laws are more beneficial to citizens than weaker federal
laws).
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What I see as actually helpful for smaller companies in the new
Act are some of the things that have been discussed that Barton
went through and also that Dennis touched on.
The idea that there is actually a codification of fair-use
defense, 60 which had been available more or less judicially, pulled
in from trademark doctrine, pulled in from copyright doctrine, the
idea that there are some things that should be okay because of the
nature of your use of a mark. 61 You are using it to describe,
because it has some descriptive properties, or you are using it
actually to identify the plaintiff. So getting that actually codified, I
think, makes defense easier and cheaper for a small company.
Codification of a parody defense, 62 the same thing. Courts
were doing it in some cases, but not in others. I think, actually, the
word “parody” lately has been pumped full of lots of things that
aren’t parody by courts. I think “parody” is a much narrower
concept than the way that a lot of courts apply it. I think that’s a
little troubling.
With respect to smaller companies that somehow are able to
get their word out—if your products are such that you make them
available online, it can be possible to get kind of a famous mark
without a lot of overhead costs. There are bloggers, where the
names of their blogs are very widely known, but they are really
quite small. 63 They could be one- or two-person operations but
have enough traction and get enough press that maybe they are
famous.

60

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2008) (excluding “any fair use” from
dilution claims).
61
Id. For a definition of the fair use defense in Copyright law, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–
18 (2006).
62
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). “[P]arodying…the famous mark owner of the goods
or services of the famous mark owner” is fair use and therefore not actionable dilution.
Id. § 1125(c)(3). For a discussion on how the Fair Use Doctrine is invoked for parody
works in copyright, see Lloyd L. Reich, Parody: Fair Use or Copyright Infringement
(1999), http://www.publaw.com/parody.html. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:126
(discussing the TDRA and parody).
63
See, e.g., BrooklynVegan, http://www.brooklynvegan.com/about.htm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2009). BrooklynVegan is a successful blog “still primarily run by one person.”
Id.
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One of the things that the new Act does for those people is to
eliminate the requirement that you have a federal registration or
that you have an inherently distinctive mark. 64 I think that opens
up the door a little bit for folks who didn’t have a branding
department that was sophisticated enough to make up a word like
“Exxon” that you knew you could protect.
So I think that, in a variety of respects, there are pieces that
make things clearer.
The other way that I think the revised Act is helpful to smaller
companies is—big companies are always going to have an
advantage in litigation. They have more resources to put into a
problem. They have more people that can focus on a litigation.
You are not tying up the president, who should be out meeting
people to generate sales. You have someone in the legal
department who is working on it.
The clarity that the new Act adds gives better defenses and
streamlines litigation, I think. I haven’t seen anything empirical on
this, but I certainly know from my own practice that litigations are
ugly when the law is unclear or where the facts aren’t clear. That’s
what keeps people fighting. You can’t get a motion to dismiss
granted. You can’t get summary judgment. You can’t easily
convince the other lawyer that they are going to lose. They have
something to hang their hat on, and that’s when things drag out.
That’s when things become expensive. That really disadvantages
small companies.
So while I understand the idea that the opportunity for niche
fame under a Federal Act is a form of loss, I think there are a lot of
countervailing bits that are helpful to smaller companies—or really
to all companies—in the sense that greater certainty reduces costs
and helps companies to govern their conduct.
So those are my bits on that.
PROF. HANSEN: Thank you.
64

J. Thomas McCarthy, The American Experience with Trademark and Anti-Dilution
Law, Seminar, Institute of Brand and Innovation Law, Trademark Infringement Without
Confusion—Dilution,
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/ibil/docs/ibil_11feb09_brochure.pdf
(discussing the difference between the FTDA and the TDRA); see also 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d).
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PROF. BEEBE: My presentation is not quite about small or big
business. It’s more an extension of the project that Dennis was
generously talking about, in terms of this sort of quantitative study
of the TDRA case law for the past two years. But I think there are
a lot of themes that come through in the numbers that are relevant
both to small and big businesses, no question.
More strictly speaking, this is just an extension of a project I
presented last year for the first anniversary of the TDRA in Santa
Clara, California. I haven’t actually published these numbers yet,
but if you want to see the first year, there is the cite for it. 65
The basic idea, by the way, behind quantitative study—it’s a
bit different from the normal method, which is the leading-cases
method. You just read the main circuit court cases that seem to
have the most heft, written by the most prestigious judges, and you
just rely on those, either to teach the doctrine or to form the
doctrine in the future. The quantitative approach is more an
approach—it’s sort of weird, admittedly—where you read every
opinion that has been written on the issue. You count those
opinions and you try to identify trends over time, or proportions
and all of that stuff.
What this study entails, over the past two years, is a reading of
every reported federal opinion, reported in Westlaw or Lexis, that
substantively treated an antidilution cause of action (either a
federal antidilution cause of action or a state’s antidilution cause of
action) for the first year of TDRA and now for the second year of
TDRA.
The main finding I have, to repeat something that Dennis was
saying, is that we essentially had more of the same. The TDRA
has not really changed much. It certainly didn’t change much in its
first year, and we don’t see that many changes in its second year.
What both years show us as a quantitative matter is that but for a
few leading cases—the kinds of cases that make it into law school
casebooks and that would give students the impression that this is a
very vital cause of action—but for those, literally, one or two
cases, the rest of the case law suggests that the antidilution cause

65

See generally Beebe, Continuing Debacle, supra note 50.
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of action is irrelevant. It’s rendered redundant by the anticonfusion cause of action.
One huge limitation of this method, without question, is that
this data set, studying these opinions, does not address the status of
antidilution cause of action in the cease-and-desist-letter context or
the settlement context or any other context outside of the federal
opinions. There is no question that the sort of ominous threat of
this mysterious word “dilution,” when perceived, possibly, by a
small company—”I don’t know what dilution is. It’s this weird
doctrine. Nobody knows what it is.” Maybe they are freaked out
by it. Maybe it’s a good way to intimidate. Certainly it is
mentioned routinely in cease-and-desist letters. But we don’t see
that, nevertheless, in the federal case law.
One final point, just for your own interest. You might wonder,
is this method worthwhile? I’m not persuaded that it is. It tells us
a few things. But maybe the leading-cases method is actually there
for a reason. Anyway, you can think about that at a sort of
theoretical level.
What I will do is, first, talk about the research question I had in
mind, why I bothered collecting all these opinions. Then I will talk
a little bit about the set of opinions and then some background
findings and then some findings directly on the antidilution cause
of action.
This is why I collected all these opinions. One basic question
was, how many TDRA opinions are there? How many antidilution
opinions are there in the federal courts? Again, it’s because in a
typical trademark law classroom you teach dilution as though it’s
this massive thing, as though it’s as big as anti-infringement. That
is at least one way to go about it. If you look at the number of
pages devoted to these subjects in casebooks, you would get that
impression. So I was curious: are there actually a lot of TDRA
opinions out there? There is no question that there are a lot of
confusing opinions out there. Those are routine.
Where are these opinions coming from, and in what postures?
As an S.D.N.Y. patriot, I wanted to see how many of these
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opinions are coming out of the S.D.N.Y. It turns out, a very high
proportion. 66
What proportion found dilution? If so, did they find blurring or
tarnishment, or did they not even bother to identify it? What
proportion found no dilution? If so, on what basis?
Here’s the key question, the second one here: how often did the
court’s ruling as to infringement coincide with and render
redundant its ruling as to dilution? That’s really the whole point of
this little project in counting these cases.
A little issue: what role, if any, has state antidilution law
played? My anticipation was that there would be a bit of a shift
toward state law claims, because the TDRA establishes a few
higher standards. I don’t have numbers to support that, but I think
you can see it qualitatively in the case law.
Survey evidence: how often is it used? Is this quantitative
method even worthwhile? That was a more theoretical question.
Here’s what I did. I went to the Lexis database, federal court
cases combined database, and typed in that search request. Over
the past two years, I have come up with 582 opinions.
I also did this in Westlaw for the first year—I haven’t gone to
Westlaw yet in the second year—to see if there are any cases in
Westlaw that are not in Lexis or vice versa. The short answer is, at
least in the first year, there were. There are a handful of cases that
one service reports and the other doesn’t.
Then I filtered them—highly subjective. Big problem for a
real empiricist. This means the whole project can’t really be called
empirical. I filtered them myself to decide if they had any
significant treatment of a dilution cause of action. If it was a
mention of dilution in the context of attorneys’ fees, late in the
case, I didn’t include the opinion. I wanted to see an actual
analysis, even if it was a few sentences long, of the cause of action
itself. But I openly admit, that makes the data set a bit fuzzy.
I came out with a total of 149 total dilution opinions over the
past two years of the TDRA; 85 from the first year, 64 from the

66

Id. at 452–54.
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second year. 67 That decrease in number I don’t think reflects
much, actually. I don’t think it suggests that there is some sort of
decline. There are quirky reasons that I won’t go into for why
there might be a slightly lower number for the second year.
If you are curious, I used those programs to go through the
opinions.
Basic findings background: It’s sort of trivia. If you are a
trademark geek, you might find this interesting. We had thirteen
circuit court opinions, four of which were reversals. The Ninth
Circuit actually gave us the most, and then the Second Circuit gave
us three. The Ninth Circuit was four.
[Slide] These are district court opinions, 136 total. Nineteen,
fourteen percent, came out of the Southern District of New York.
As seen in other empirical studies of the confusion side of
trademark law, the S.D.N.Y. definitely dominates.
[Slide] This is sort of borderline trivia. This is a crosstabulation of, in the 136 district court opinions, the posture of the
opinion, down here on the left, and then the outcome of the
dilution cause of action, up here going horizontally. For example,
there were nineteen total preliminary-injunction opinions, of which
nine found dilution and ten found no dilution.
I’m not sure if these are particularly interesting. There is sort
of a nice balance on the bench trial sides. Summary Judgmentcrosses typically found no dilution, and Summary Judgmentsdefendants were typically granted, twenty-nine to nine, and so on.
[Slide] Here is one last background issue, in terms of some
numbers, the “dead hand” of the FTDA. There was, in a few
cases, especially out of the Ninth Circuit in the Jada Toys 68 line of
cases, a lot of confusion about the retroactivity of the TDRA. 69
67
68
69

Id. at 453, 461.
Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628 (9th Cir. 2008).
See, e.g., id. at 634 n.2.
We note that in this case the district court applied the prior version of
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”), which required a
showing of actual dilution . . . . [S]ince that time the FTDA has been
amended so as to require only a likelihood of dilution to succeed. . . .
[W]e choose to apply the standard currently in operation . . . [w]e are
aware that in Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035
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The basic doctrine is, if you ever have to deal with this—and now
it’s fairly well-settled. You see it in district court opinions in the
Southern District—no problems. If you are seeking prospective
relief, the TDRA applies, regardless of when the defendant’s
conduct began. 70 Before the Act or after, it doesn’t matter. If you
are seeking prospective relief, TDRA applies.
If you are seeking damages, then the FTDA applies if the
conduct began on or before October 6, 2006. If you are curious,
you can look at this Jada Toys line of cases. 71
This retroactivity issue wasn’t addressed in the statute. The
courts are busy. They don’t have time to look into this stuff a lot.
So it created some confusion, with the result that we still have
some FTDA analyses, as Dennis was saying, still floating out there
that think they are applying the TDRA, but are otherwise applying
old circuit precedents that were based on the old FTDA.
There are some numbers to that effect, going to opinions in the
first year of the TDRA and then in the second year of the TDRA.
It’s getting better, but we still see a few opinions in the second year
where the plaintiff was seeking only prospective relief, and the
court nevertheless explicitly applied the old FTDA and the actual
provisions of the FTDA.
The Pet Silk 72 case is a weird one, in the Southern District of
Texas. This was a case that applied very dutifully the new act, the
TDRA, and said, “We’re on top of this. We’re aware of the new

(9th Cir. 2007), we applied the FTDA retroactively, thereby creating
an unintentional intra-circuit conflict with Nissan.
Id. at 634 n.2 (citations omitted).
70
See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Corp., 477 F.3d 765, 766 (2d Cir.
2007) (“The amended statute [the TDRA] applies to this case to the extent that Starbucks
has sought injunctive relief on the issue of dilution.” (citations omitted)); see also
Verilux, Inc. v. Hahn, No. 3:05cv254 (PCD), 2007 WL 2318819 (D. Conn. Aug. 10,
2007) (“The Second Circuit has held that the TDRA applies retroactively to a claim filed
before the statute went into effect. . . .”).
71
See, e.g., Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1015
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Jada Toys); Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp. 590 F. Supp. 2d
1306 (D. Nev. 2008) (“Although the TDRA was in effect at the time . . . this court again
granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on its trademark dilution claim under the FTDA.
The court did so pursuant to Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc. . . . .”).
72
Pet Silk, Inc. v. Jackson, 481 F. Supp. 2d 824 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
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act,” 73 and then floated old Fifth Circuit doctrine that supported the
concept of niche fame, and so found that Pet Silk was nichefamous. 74 It’s a tough case.
[Slide] This is really, though, what I was interested in. This is
the whole point of the project: to do a cross-tabulation of
infringement outcomes with dilution outcomes in individual
opinions. Here I’m using the 110 district court opinions. These
are opinions that explicitly considered both causes of action. Some
of the opinions only considered dilution that I included in my data
set. I’m concerned here with the 110 that explicitly considered
both causes of action during this two-year period.
What we see is that of these 110, 30 found both dilution and
infringement, 38 found no infringement and no dilution—a total
coincidence—28 said same thing, fact issue on both. We have two
that found infringements and no dilution, which makes a lot of
sense. You find infringement, you get your remedies; why bother
with dilution? You maybe put more pressure on the dilution side.
If you are hostile to dilution, then you don’t find it.
We had eight that said infringement was a fact issue and then
went on to find, “We don’t have any problem with facts on
dilution. There is no dilution.” 75
What I’m really curious about, though, is this box here, cases
in which the court explicitly said, “I do not find consumer
confusion, but I do find dilution.” That would be a situation in
which the dilution cause of action is actually doing something, is
actually providing a remedy that has not already been provided by
the infringement cause of action. In this two-year period, there
were zero cases in which a court explicitly considered confusion
73

See id. at 832 (acknowledging that Congress has implemented the TDRA and
quoting relevant language from the Act).
74
See id. (“[T]he Fifth Circuit has held that market fame is sufficient. PSI has not
licensed the use of its name in the domain of any of its distributors save a few in Europe
that deal exclusively in Pet Silk® products. Therefore, the mark meets § 1125(c)(2)(A)’s
definition of famous.”). The court also stated that “the Pet Silk mark has achieved
distinction in its market.” Id. at 831.
75
See, e.g., Hodgon Powder Co., Inc. v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d
1221, 1223 (D. Kan. 2007) (finding that likelihood of confusion between two similar
marks, a requirement to establish trademark infringement, is a question of fact, but
dismissing the plaintiff’s dilution claim).
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and dilution, and found no confusion, but then found dilution,
which is pretty striking, at least in my mind, for all of the attention
given to the cause of action.
This, I think, definitely supports Dennis’s proposition that there
is a lot of redundancy so far in TDRA.
I was giving this presentation last week in Palm Springs at this
California State Bar conference. My co-panelists said, “Ah, but
you haven’t heard about the Hershey v. Art Van Furniture 76 case,”
which totally blows away my zero number. There’s something
beautiful about being able to say “zero.” We now have, in the third
year of the TDRA, so far one opinion, out of the Eastern District of
Michigan, just a few weeks ago, in which the court explicitly said
there is no confusion, but there is dilution. 77 You could quibble
with the opinion, on whatever basis you want.
So here we are, finally. I was saying zero, but that was only
for the first two years. Now we have, in the third year, a situation
where the defendant was using this trade dress on its van. 78
Hershey sued, saying that consumers would be confused—they
would think Hershey is now in the van lines business 79 —and
secondly, “It dilutes the distinctiveness of our mark and tarnishes
our reputation.” 80
The court said, “No consumer is going to be confused into
thinking you are a van lines company now, 81 but it does dilute the

76

Hershey Co. v. Art Van Furniture, Inc., No. 08-14463, 2008 WL 4724756 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 24, 2008).
77
Id. at *8, *14. The court first acknowledged that “[b]y itself, a newspaper article
noting a resemblance between Defendant’s truck design and Plaintiff's trade dress is not
evidence of consumer confusion.” Id. at *8. The court continued, holding that “[u]nder
the test established by the FDTA, the Court finds that a likelihood exists that Defendant’s
design will cause dilution of Plaintiff's mark.” Id. at *14.
78
Id. at *1.
79
Id. at *1, *8.
80
Id. at *1. Plaintiff cited a dilution by tarnishment claim in its brief, but corrected the
claim during its oral argument. Id. The court granted plaintiff’s request for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction only for its dilution by blurring claim. Id.
81
Id. at *12 (“[T]he court finds it unlikely that Defendant’s truck design will cause
consumers to believe that Art Van is somehow affiliated or associated with Hershey, or
that customers will patronize Defendant’s stores or purchase its products due to confusion
over the source of Defendant’s goods.”).
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distinctiveness of your trade dress. 82 Some of your advertising
seems to refer to the brown of Hershey’s. So we will say that this
blurs the link between that look and the product category, candy
bars, to which it is typically affixed.” 83
So there is one so far.
Just in conclusion, a couple of tiny things that may not be that
helpful. In the first two years, you see a very high correlation
between infringement and dilution outcomes. Then, if you wanted
to do a word-count analysis—I don’t know why you would, but if
you wanted to—you could do a word-count analysis of the
opinions and count the proportion of words that are devoted to
infringement analysis and the proportion of words that are devoted
to dilution analysis, just to get some handle on the intuition that a
lot of trademark lawyers have that courts consider infringement
and then ignore dilution.
[Slide] The numbers bear that out. I won’t belabor this. This
is a chart showing that of 130 opinions here, the ratio of the
number of words devoted to infringement versus dilution. To
make a long story short, these are all opinions in which there was a
much higher proportion of infringement analysis than dilution
analysis. We have very few opinions, relatively speaking, in
which the court seems to pay more attention to dilution than
infringement.
But I’m the first to admit that that’s a crazy slide.
I mentioned one nice opinion, the Art Van opinion, where a
court said no infringement, but dilution. 84 Now here are four
opinions, some of which have already been mentioned, where a
court didn’t bother to analyze an infringement cause of action, but
they did analyze dilution. In these four opinions, we have a
finding of dilution.

82
Id. at *15 (“Plaintiff sustains its burden to show a reasonable likelihood of
succeeding on the merits of its dilution by blurring claim.”).
83
Id. (“[D]efendant’s ‘couch bar’ design, with its stylized block lettering, its
packaging in two elements, and especially its silver foil visible beneath the wrapper’s
sleeve, bears an unmistakable resemblance to some of Plaintiff’s candy bars . . . .”).
84
Id. at *12, *15.
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The Qwest case is a weird case. It’s a tiny little opinion, with a
declaratory judgment. 85 I think the defendant never showed up.
So I’m not sure that is a particularly strong case for celebrating the
TDRA.
Nike v. Nikepal 86 is arguably a great dilution case. It’s a
situation where the courts didn’t really bother to talk about
confusion, because the defendant in this case said, “I’m selling
laboratory instruments under the name Nikepal. How did I come
up with ‘Nikepal’? I opened a dictionary and chose ‘Nike’ and
then added ‘pal’ onto the end of it because that’s the first syllable
of my first name. 87 I didn’t think it would matter that it sounds
like ‘Nike.’” 88
Very little likelihood of consumer confusion. Nike selling
laboratory instruments? It doesn’t make sense. Nevertheless, the
court says this does blur the distinctiveness of the Nike mark, and
so there was dilution found. 89
I’ll mention the V Secret Catalogue 90 case. This is a really
lovely discussion of dilution flowing from the Supreme Court’s
opinion in 2003 involving Victoria’s Secret and a strip-mall store
in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, that called itself Victor’s Secret,
which sold various sex toys. 91 Victoria’s Secret sued, saying,
“Consumers will be confused. Furthermore, you are blurring and
tarnishing our reputation.” 92 So that’s the background to this
Victoria’s Secret case that went up to the Supreme Court and
eventually made its way back down to the Western District of
Kentucky. 93
85
Qwest Commc’ns Int’l v. Sonny Corp., No. C06-0020P, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS
87007, at *14 (D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2006) (“The Court . . . enjoin[ed] Defendant . . . from
diluting Plaintiff’s QWEST marks and/or . . . dilut[ing] the distinctive quality of the
QWEST marks . . . .”).
86
Nike v. Nikepal, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1820 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
87
Id. at 1823.
88
See id.
89
Id. at 1826–28.
90
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D. Ky. 2008).
91
Id. at 736.
92
See id. at 736–37
93
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 WL 370525 (W.D.
Ky. Feb. 9, 2000), aff’d, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 418 (2003),
remanded to 558 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D. Ky. 2008).
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The anecdotal story is that an Army colonel from a local Army
base saw an advertisement for Victor’s Secret in the local Army
newspaper and was appalled that this was going on in his country
and wrote to Victoria’s Secret, with the advertisement, and said,
“Look what they’re doing. You should stop this.” 94 So Victoria’s
Secret sued.
Is there likely confusion, as you drive up to this store called
Victor’s Secret? Probably not. You don’t think it’s actually a
licensed chain of Victoria’s Secret. Nevertheless, there is arguably
some degree of dilution, perhaps. In Victoria’s Secret’s mind,
there was also tarnishment, because it was tarnishing their image.
You can work through that in your own time.
It reminds one of the old “Debbie Does Dallas” 95 case, if you
know the lore of trademark law, where the reputation of the Dallas
Cowboy Cheerleaders was being tarnished by the use of their
uniforms in a pornographic film. 96 It’s the same sort of strange
argument.
The last point, modes of dilution. One of the great reasons to
celebrate the TDRA is that it explicitly defines blurring 97 and
tarnishment. 98 Now it gives courts the opportunity to actually
explain which form of dilution they are finding. We see that a
good majority of courts are doing so. But it’s still depressing that
also a good proportion are not explicitly saying tarnishment or
blurring. They are just saying dilution, which I think also one
could read, though reasonable minds could disagree, as again an
example of the extent to which courts sort of think of this cause of
action as an afterthought. It’s not nearly as important as confusion.
94

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 423 (2003).
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1979).
96
Id. at 202–03.
97
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2(c)(2)(B)(1)120
Stat. 1730, 1731 (2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2008))
(“‘[D]ilution by blurring’ is association arising from the similarity between a mark or
trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”).
98
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2(c)(2)(C)(1) (codified at §
1125(c)(2)(C)) (“‘[D]ilution by tarnishment’ is association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous
mark.”).
95
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A final point. I wish I had good numbers for you to support
this. All I can really say is that one feels like there has been a shift
to state-level causes of action. I think, going to some of the themes
that Eric was talking about, there has been a bit of a shift also for
big companies. Some of the language in the TDRA can be parsed
in such a way that not only do you have to show that there is
association arising from similarity, but you also have to show that
that association arising from similarity impairs the distinctiveness
of the mark.
So you can get survey evidence that shows association arising
from similarity. The court says, “Great. You’ve shown me that
when a consumer sees ‘Charbucks,’ maybe they think of
Starbucks. That’s right. There is association. But now prove to
me, Survey Expert, that that is actually leading to the impairment
of distinctiveness.” That’s the language under the TDRA. 99
That’s where courts that are hostile to antidilution cause of action
at the federal level will say, “There’s no showing of impairment of
distinctiveness. I find no dilution.”
That’s the Achilles’ heel, I think, of the “blurring” definition in
the act: not just association, but impairment of distinctiveness.
Nikepal found dilution, but in Nikepal the court said, “We found
association. Therefore, there is dilution.” 100 The court did not
bother to invoke that third part of the definition. 101 But I suppose
one should be aware of how that definition can be split up.
I think that’s it for the presentation.
PROF. HANSEN: Thank you very much, Barton. Your
statistical survey and analysis are a very valuable additional to the
literature. And thanks to the rest of the panel for their
presentations. Very interesting.
Just some thoughts.

99

Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2(c)(2)(B)(1) (codified at §
1125(c)(2)(B)) (“‘[D]ilution by blurring’ . . . impairs the distinctiveness of the famous
mark.”).
100
See Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int’l, Inc., 2007 WL 2782030, at *7–8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18,
2007) (discussing Nike as a distinctive trademark and finding association between Nike
and Nikepal and dilution).
101
See id. (finding dilution without discussing the impairment of distinctiveness factor).
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As for whether post Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, courts are less
likely to find dilution one has to look at whether dilution plaintiffs
are winning no matter what the rationale. Federal district courts, I
think, are interested in two things: getting what they consider is the
right result, and (2) not being reversed. A district court who finds
no likelihood of confusion but then finds dilution in this postVictoria’s Secret world is putting a sign of the case to the court of
appeals that says, “take a close look at this one.” A district court
reduces the likelihood of reversal if it either finds only likelihood
of confusion or both dilution and likelihood of confusion.
Therefore, statistics about whether dilution claims are upheld do
not reflect these real politic considerations. In short, Victoria’s
Secret might have caused dilution wins to go underground.
Moreover, in my view trademark actions, whether for traditional
infringement or dilution, are going to be decided upon a
misappropriation-of-goodwill basis in any case. Dilution doctrine
was just another way to justify that result. The district court is
never going to say that but dilution law was doctrinally closer to
what was going on and, therefore, useful. Now, the best way to
avoid reversal is to call a dilution case a run-of-the mill confusion
case rather than the rare and esoteric dilution case. The difference
in appellate scrutiny is, I think, dramatic.
As for the lack of discussion of likelihood of confusion on
remand, in Victoria’s Secret, the district court did not discuss it,
because it already had granted summary judgment for the
defendant before the case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit and
Supreme Court. 102
What Dennis mentioned—Pet Silk and all the others—that
these were famous marks . . .
PROF. BEEBE: Yes.
PROF. HANSEN: And clearly they are not famous marks. So
how did the district courts conclude that they were? It’s probably a
small company—I don’t know the case—probably a competitor,
misappropriation of goodwill. If the judge has to say “famous
102

V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (W.D. Ky. 2008)
(“This court granted summary judgment in favor of the Moseleys on all claims [including
confusion] except the FTDA claim.”).
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mark,” it will say it. If it has to say now, likelihood of confusion,
it will say it. If it has to say “Rasputin,” it’ll say “Rasputin.” I
think the judge determines who is going to lose, and then says the
doctrinal mantra that is required.
In Victoria’s Secret, if you read the oral argument of the
Supreme Court, there were three advocates. 103 One is from the
Solicitor General’s Office. 104 Very able it was his last argument.
He had argued something like a gazillion arguments in the
Supreme Court. He was not an IP person. He was a generalist, as
is appropriate in that office.
Then there was Victoria’s Secret’s Supreme Court advocate,
who was not a trademark attorney. 105
He was brought in because he was a Supreme Court specialist.
Then there was this little defendant in the Western District of
Kentucky whose lawyers went up there. 106
He was the only one who knew what dilution meant. The rest
were talking about likelihood of confusion. This is at the Supreme
Court level. Two out of three could not articulate what dilution
was. The questions from the Court clearly showed that they
weren’t sure what dilution was either. 107 Particularly when a court
cannot figure out the doctrine, it resorts to policies it understands.
Then there is Starbucks case that Dennis mentioned. How
might that play out? The court can’t figure out dilution but it
knows that the defendant is a local guy, a good guy, and Starbucks
and its elite clientele are full of what?
MR. MCCOOE: Full of beans.
PROF. HANSEN: Full of beans, that’s good. I like that.

103
Oral Argument, Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), 2002
WL 31643067, at *1–2.
104
Id. (“Lawrence G. Wallace, Esq., Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., on behalf of the as [sic] United States, as amicus curiae, supporting
the Petitioner.”).
105
Id. (“Walter E. Dellinger, Jr., Washington, D.C., on behalf of the Respondents.”).
106
Id. (“James R. Higgens, Jr., Esq., Louisville, Kentucky, on behalf of the
Petitioner.”).
107
Id. at *4–5 (“[I]t would help me a lot if you explained to me what dilution is. . . . I
want some explanation of what dilution here refers to.”).
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I meant full of themselves: poseurs who sit there writing their
novels in Starbucks and pay ten bucks for a cup of coffee. And
here’s my little good old guy with instant coffee or something like
this, and they’re coming out and messing with him. No, they’re
not going to mess with our guy.
So I think when you get those in-the-hinterland cases or just a
judge who is fed up with snob products or services you are going
to get those results for little defendants. But I don’t think those
cases are what you should look to see as to what will happen
generally in dilution cases.
Another point is that even judges who might be predisposed to
the small, local defendant, turn on them when they lie. I think that
was a big factor in Victoria’s Secret, along with the fact that his
store also sold pornography. This guy made the mistake of saying,
“I hadn’t even heard of Victoria’s Secret before I chose my name.
It was a surprise to me when I got this phone call.” 108
Then he lied about how he chose the name “Victor’s Secret.”
It was Victor’s Secret; he changed it to Victor’s Little Secret after
Victoria’s Secret objected. 109
He said, “Well, I didn’t want my employer to know that I had
another job.”
One problem with this statement was then why then did you
put your name in the store’s name? The second problem was, he
had no employer when he chose the name. He was unemployed at
that time. Multiple liar.
For the district court, this guy was going down no matter what.
And that was not going to change on remand from the Supreme
Court.
We all learn the law through casebooks that discuss the
appellate decisions and assumed after reversals the winning party
prevails below. But rarely do we look to what happened below
108
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5215, at *3–4 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2000) (“The Moseleys assert that they were not aware of
Victoria’s Secret catalog or stores until they received a cease and desist letter from
counsel for Victoria’s Secret on February 25, 1998.”).
109
Id. at *4 (“The Moseleys subsequently changed the name of their store to ‘Victor’s
Little Secret.’”).
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after a remand. People might think the district court says, “Oh,
I’ve learned. I was wrong. I’ll know better next time. Thanks for
telling me.” No. At least some, if not most, district courts are
looking for ways to reach the same result they considered correct
the first time. And now they have the added hostility to the party
that caused the reversal.
This type of thing happened in the infamous trademark
decision by Judge Leval in Haar. 110
In that case, the defendant conceded on appeal that the
plaintiff’s mark was famous. Judge Leval, nevertheless, opined
that niche marks, such as plaintiff’s, and marks with acquired
distinctiveness, such as plaintiff’s, could not be famous under the
FTDA, reversing and remanding to the district court. The district
court might well be expected to dismiss the case based upon Judge
Leval’s decision. It really had no other choice. Leval’s opinion
was a tour de force setting out his strong views on how dilution
law should be construed. Judge Leval is one of the best judges in
the country but I think this decision, at least with regard to his
holding that marks with acquired distinctiveness cannot be
“famous” under the FTDA, was clearly not one of his best. He
also went after niche marks. 111 It goes back down to the district
court judge, who reinstated his judgment for the plaintiff, not even
mentioning Judge Leval’s decision in the Second Circuit. 112
He thought he was right the first time. He had determined on
policy grounds that the defendant should lose, and the Second
Circuit decision and its new doctrine was not going to get in his
way to reach that result. 113

110

TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 99 (“It seems unlikely that Congress intended to confer on marks that have
enjoyed only brief fame in a small part of the country, or among a small segment of the
population, the power to enjoin all other users throughout the nation in all realms of
commerce.”).
112
See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 1825 (RCC), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13543, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004) (granting plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment for the same reason as the prior case, that defendant was
appearing pro se and thereby violated established Second Circuit precedent).
113
See id. at *1–22 (granting summary judgment to plaintiff on all claims).
111
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So down in the district court it can get pretty tough, mano a
mano. Parties perceived as “bad guys” need more than favorable
doctrine to win there. I think most district courts today want to
protect a mark owner’s goodwill from unauthorized use, and will
try to do so whether they are able to use the dilution doctrine to do
it or not.
Other thoughts? Comments?
MR. PRAGER: I think one of the great difficulties that dilution
has always had, which is not remedied in the revisions to the
statute, is that the factors that get advanced to measure the
presence or absence of dilution don’t do that.
Impairing
distinctiveness is not measured by how strong a plaintiff’s mark is.
You need a strong mark to be susceptible of dilution. The degree
of similarity gets you close. Willful conduct certainly doesn’t
measure whether there is blurring. That’s just punishing the bad
guy. Whether there is competition between them—I’m not sure
that measures it either. The whole idea is the absence of
competition.
So we are really putting courts out there with tests that don’t
work. I think that’s a big part of the problem, why you have sort
of flaky decision making over many years.
Impairing the distinctiveness, I think, is measurable. I think
you can use surveys to measure that. That’s going to favor the big
guy again. Surveys are expensive. But at least it’s some kind of
evidence of what’s happening in people’s brains, whether there has
been some impairing of distinctiveness.
But I think it would be a sounder body of case law if the
decisions would rely on something that actually does measure what
you say you are trying to protect.
MR. MCCOOE: One of the things that Eric mentioned was
testing it by survey evidence. The empirical issue that we faced,
both under the old standard and the current one, is that you
necessarily have to have a base line. You have to know how
strong your mark was at the time just prior to the commencement
of the allegedly infringing conduct. Unless you are involved in
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another lawsuit, you are going to get “Dauberted.” 114 You
absolutely will not have evidence that is going to pass muster to
show exactly how strong it is from a likelihood-of-dilution
standpoint. You can show that you have a lot of eyeballs on the
Internet. You can show that you sold a lot of catalogues, that you
spent X dollars in advertising.
Courts are already hostile to a lot of that anyway. They say,
“That doesn’t show that your mark is necessarily strong. You have
to show that, in fact, it had an impact on those people with their
eyeballs and the people that get the catalogues. They just throw
them in the garbage, don’t they? Prove to me that I’m wrong.”
So you need a base line to show just how strong you were and
then you have to causally prove that the new data showing the
decline in strength of the mark is, in fact, associated directly to the
infringing behavior. In this kind of a market, I could suggest that
right now it would be impossible for anyone to bring a cause of
action to show by survey evidence that, in fact, their mark has
suffered from dilution. We are in the middle of a catastrophic
decline in economic circumstances. Unless your business is
immune from the effects of what’s going on, you can’t show,
necessarily, that the loss in goodwill and reputation is, in fact,
associated with this guy’s bad behavior, as opposed to you being
out of fashion—people aren’t buying it; it’s a luxury good—“I
know you’re a very famous brandy, Hennessy, but you can’t show
that, in fact people are buying it.” When it costs seventy-five
bucks a bottle, I’m not buying it because I can’t afford it. I’m
going to get good old Jim Beam.
MR. PRAGER: There are sort of two solutions. There are a lot
of companies that periodically measure consumer response to their
brands—again, mostly larger consumer products companies.115
114

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (“[T]he trial
judge must [use the Federal Rules of Evidence to] ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable . . . .”).
115
See, e.g., P&G Deploys Product Research Software, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, June 8,
2009,
http://www.progressivegrocer.com/progressivegrocer/content_display/features/
supermarket-technology/e3idad2bb8d4869dcd6fa1ac86c6006942a (Proctor & Gamble is
using technology to “gain a complete view of customer attitudes and preferences about its
products.”).
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But they regularly check at intervals how people are reacting, to
tweak them. That’s why you get different colors of packaging
sometimes or they change their fonts.
Another thing you can do is—your litigation might last two
years. If you didn’t get a preliminary injunction, measure it
immediately and then see how you are looking at trial.
MR. MCCOOE: But from a legal standpoint, you actually have
to show what the strength was prior to the commencement of the
illegal conduct. 116 If you even do the study six months later, it’s
subject to attack for being not reflective of exactly what’s going
on, but in fact reflecting what’s going on six or seven months later.
So you are already starting with a faulty data set.
It’s still problematic. The surveys are constantly under attack
in likelihood-of-confusion cases, and they have been doing those
for a hundred years. We have very well-established types of tests,
work tests and so on. Yet people misapply those tests. These are
trained statisticians, who have been in court before, who have
already been subject to Daubert, and have been harshly criticized.
They come back and say, “Okay, I’m going to get it right this
time,” and they misunderstand what the facts are in this case. So
they use a different standard, when they are supposed to use the
same one when they were criticized before, because the case is
different.
There isn’t a well-established set of standards for proving
dilution, much less actual dilution. It’s going to continue to be a
problem.
One of the things that was at least touched on here is that we
may not see a lot of opinions, even going forward, for some time,
because the real strength of a dilution cause of action is in the
cease-and-desist letter, is in threatening a smaller player to get
them to stop—if you are policing your market. Famous marks tend
to be more actively policed. The fact is that if you have such a
valuable mark, you are absolutely a fool, even in this type of
environment economically, to let anything go. You have to be
116

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)–(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2008). The statute defines criteria to
determine whether a mark is famous and states that it must meet these requirements to be
eligible for relief. Id.
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vigilant. Those that are vigilant will be on the ball. They have
people who all they do is look for people like Charbucks.
Starbucks most certainly has somebody who, at least on a weekly
basis, if not a daily basis, is out there just Googling.
Google actually has a tool that allows you to look for
references to your mark. 117 You may not find Charbucks, because
you would have to have a pretty sophisticated program. “Bucks” is
a common word otherwise, and you are not going to pick it all up.
But if you have a mark that is worth fighting about, you are
going to be looking to see how people are using it and making sure
that it’s not becoming generic and it’s also not being used in a
manner that is blurring or tarnishing the value that you have spent
so many millions of dollars in trying to develop, and all that it
means for your business.
PROF. HANSEN: So words to the wise: Be vigilant. Dennis
and Eric will be around afterwards with their cards, just in case
you need people to be vigilant for you.
Why don’t we go to the audience for questions or comments or
thoughts or anything? Please identify yourself, your name and
affiliation, if any.
QUESTION: My name is Ilana Turko. My affiliation is with
Fordham Law. I’m a 2L. In terms of a big-picture takeaway for
small businesses, if much of the effect of the dilution act is in
cease-and-desist letters and settlement practice, where does that
leave small businesses? It seems like they just lose, even though
it’s simplifying the litigation process and it’s increasing the
certainty of the outcome. The small businesses aren’t going to
have people out there sending out cease-and-desist letters. Plus
they have now niche-famous marks. What’s the implication there?
PROF. HANSEN: For a small business, I think, actually, my
advice would be, stay away from the Southern District of New
York, which has been generally not respectful of state dilution law,
at least as an independent grounds separate from federal dilution.

117

Google Alerts, http://www.google.com/alerts (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) (“Google
Alerts are email updates of the latest relevant Google results (web, news, etc.) based on
your choice of query or topic.”).
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They constantly say, “There’s a federal statute and there’s a state
statute, but we think it means the same.” 118
Even when they are corrected, they go back and do it. They
don’t want to spend the time, and they don’t really care what the
states do.
There is a sort of elitism present that is not present in state
courts. I would go to state court and I would just make my case
that we are being hurt by this defendant and state law was passed
to protect plaintiffs in our position. State court judges, particularly
on the lower court level, have neither the time nor the background
to go deeply into IP law which is normally handled in federal
courts. They are generally not policy wonks and won’t be
concerned about the possible theoretical deficiencies in dilution
law as federal judges might well do. I think the small plaintiff
nowadays does well to either go to a federal court in the
hinterlands, which is anywhere outside the city of New York, or a
state court. I think you will get a good hearing, actually.
MR. PRAGER: Everybody has a different experience in their
practice. Dennis’s experience with respect to small companies
receiving cease-and-desist letters is somewhat different than mine.
I don’t see a dilution claim in a cease-and-desist letter as much of a
game changer. When a cease-and-desist letter comes in, you sort
of treat it on its merits. Frankly, I don’t care what the letter says. I
care what the circumstances are. The letter is just giving me
notice. I don’t care what the other lawyer thinks the problem is.
Now I know this guy is out here with his mark, and I have to
analyze it like I would if I found it in a search report.
Maybe that’s a more sophisticated way of looking at it, from
someone who does it a lot. If you are a general practitioner in a
118

Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
While the Second Circuit has cautioned district courts that “it is not
clear that the [New York] statute is coextensive with the [TDRA],”
both the federal and the state statutes require that plaintiffs show a
likelihood of dilution, rather than actual dilution. . . . Thus, while the
two statutes may not be identical, they are substantively similar and
may be analyzed together.
Id. (quoting Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765, 766 (2d Cir.
2007)).
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small town and you don’t see many trademark cases, maybe you
look at it differently. But that’s a different kind of problem.
That’s not a problem created by dilution. That’s just a problem
created by different resources available to different-size
businesses.
PROF. HANSEN: Ilana, I may have gotten your question
wrong. Did you say in your hypothetical that the company is small
and it receives a cease-and-desist letter, or that the company is
small and want to protect its mark?
QUESTIONER: Actually, it can go either way.
PROF. HANSEN: I was answering in the situation where you
are small and want to protect a mark. In both situations it is
difficult but there is a chance for the small company in state as a
plaintiff. If the small company is a potential defendant it is very
tough. I agree if your point was that they are screwed. That is
what you said, isn’t it?
MR. PRAGER: Ilana said they are going to lose.
MR. MCCOOE: When I was talking before about its
application and use, I was talking about a small company that
doesn’t have the resources to bring a big-city law firm in. What
they see now is some case—and always it’s going to be trotting out
numbers. You have a copyright case, and it’s never a copyright
case where you are going to get hit for $750. No. It’s that you can
get hit for up to $150,000 per work. It’s intended to try to get you
to sit up and take notice. If you are a small player, obviously—I
don’t think it’s a game changer. I just know that, as the professors
have both stated, it gets used constantly. They get used
interchangeably, which is odd, since, as Eric alluded to, they are
supposed to be for different kinds of things. If there is confusion,
then it’s not dilution, and vice versa.
Yet they get used interchangeably, as if, “If I lose this, I’ll have
this one to pull out.”
I think, from a small player’s standpoint, judges also in
settlement may, if they are not fully up to speed—they have to
listen at least.
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We were in court a little while ago, in the Southern District.
We were before a magistrate. This was clearly not a case of
dilution. It was about counterfeit goods. Our client was allegedly
selling counterfeit goods it had bought from Asia. The other side,
from California, applying a much more loosey-goosey kind of
approach, was telling the judge what the standards were.
We were saying, “No. We’re in the Southern District. You
have to prove actual damages. You’re not going to make out this
case.”
He said, “Yeah, but I also have the dilution case.”
Well, Sean John may be famous somewhere, but how are these
identical goods dilutive? They might be tarnishing, I suppose, if
you are selling junk. But they are identical goods. People are
going to be confused. There’s not going to be tarnishment or
blurring. Sean John may or may not be selling all top-quality
goods.
But the fact is, the judge has to now listen to it. It does actually
provide some opportunity for some jousting.
You say, “Well, Your Honor, I’m going to lose on this. Even
if what you find is not confusing, I’m going to show that it’s a
famous mark and it’s dilutive.”
It attenuates the whole process, and it gives judges who aren’t
as sophisticated—and that’s typically not going to be in the
Southern District, although they get it wrong—they are going to
give them one more thing they have to chew over. They are going
to say, “Settle.”
So it costs the small guy.
The other side of it, though, is, if you are really famous and
you are going to get hit with a dilution claim, your costs as a small
guy are small. You may have, in fact, been like Victor and known
that you were playing off of the famous mark. Typically, people
do misunderstand what parody is. It’s not about just taking
advantage of the other guy’s mark, being a free rider. It’s
supposed to actually comment and criticize or have some relevance
to the other guy’s mark. You can get in and out quick—“hey, no
problem. You can’t prove what my costs have been. My damages
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are nothing. You haven’t been harmed. So I don’t have to pay you
anything extra.” But you are probably going to get what you want.
In most cases you want an injunction, and the little guy is going to
stop.
PROF. HANSEN: Any other questions, comments, thoughts?
QUESTION: Jim Quinton. I have my own practice.
In the new statute is your own registration still a defense to
dilution? Isn’t one thing to do—with the little clients that I have, I
try to encourage them to get their own federal registration.
PROF. HANSEN: Then state law is preempted, if the
defendant has a federal registration. Yes, if you are likely to be a
defendant someplace, you certainly want to have—anyway,
whether you are a defendant or not—you definitely want to get
registered. You certainly knock out the state law in that case.
MR. MCCOOE: What about state trademark registrations? Do
you think they have any role at all in trying to deflect a claim.
PROF. HANSEN: I like state registrations. One, it shows the
company is serious about its mark. If I’m doing a search and I see
someone in North Carolina and it’s just their name and they are
doing business under a certain name, I am not sure that they are
serious about it or even if they are still in business. On the other
hand, if the company has a state trademark registration, it tells me
that they have a lawyer, probably a trademark lawyer, and they are
serious about the mark. Without any further investigation, it
indicates that it might be advisable to stay a little further away
from that name in choosing a mark.
So state registrations give notice and remove the defense of
bona fide junior uses. If and when you are in court as a plaintiff, it
allows you to say to the judge, “Your Honor, we’ve been
protecting this from day one the best way we can. It’s very
important to us. We had a state registration three days after we
started doing it.” All that stuff, I think—the more you do to
protect, the more vigilant you are, the better for your side.
So I don’t think, substantively, it adds much but it has
beneficial effects.
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QUESTION: My name is Amanda Stevens. I’m with Pryor
Cashman.
One of you mentioned that you think the parody defense has
kind of expanded beyond its traditional meaning.
I was
wondering, what kind of player do you think is doing that? What
are some effective strategies to combat it?
PROF. BEEBE: I think you actually raised this proposition.
There are a few cases that come quickly to mind, like the
“Walocaust” case out of the Northern District of Georgia. 119 This
was a case in which a guy was making fun of Wal-Mart. 120 He
used terms like “Walocaust.” 121 To its great credit, Wal-Mart
chose its defendant very well. They chose this utterly noxious,
horrible form of social commentary.
But the court found no dilution and pretty much called it
parody. 122 At this point, parody becomes meaningless, if we are
calling that parody. There was something else to it. There was
something very twisted about it. But it wasn’t parody, at least as
that is defined in the copyright case, the 2 Live Crew case from the
1990s. 123
Then there is another case, the Charbucks case. Parody was
mentioned there. 124 The courts vaguely alluded to parody as a
basis for not finding dilution. 125
119

Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
See id. at 1309 (“[Defendant] believes that Wal-Mart has a destructive effect on
communities, treats workers badly, and has a damaging influence on the United States as
a whole . . . [defendant] likens it to that of the Nazi regime . . . . [Defendant] created
various designs and slogans that incorporated the word ‘Walocaust,’ . . . by combining
the first three letters of Wal-Mart’s name with the last six letters of the word
‘holocaust.’”).
121
Id.
122
Id. at 1340 (“[Defendant’s] parodic work is considered noncommercial speech and
therefore not subject to Wal-Mart’s trademark dilution claims, despite the fact that
[defendant] sold the designs to the public on t-shirts and other novelty merchandise.”).
123
Cambpell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 581 (1994) (“For the
purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions, and the heart of any parodist’s
claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some elements of a prior author’s
composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author’s works.”
(citation omitted)).
124
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 472, 478
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
120
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Then, of course, the Louis Vuitton 126 case, which involves pet
toys of various kinds [that] parody or satirize some of the most
luxury brands. 127
So these are great recent cases that all suggest that courts are
willing to accept the parody defense. Actually, I’m fully in favor
of that trend, but then I guess I’m more of a defendant’s trademark
person. I think it’s a real ray of enlightenment in the federal courts
to tolerate this stuff.
I’m not sure how it can be defended against. That’s history.
Reason is prevailing in those cases.
PROF. HANSEN: What is the alleged parody in the Wal-Mart
case? 128
MR. MCCOOE: They were commenting, I believe, to a certain
extent, on how Wal-Mart was working a holocaust on small towns
and small stores. 129
PROF. HANSEN: Well, is that a parody?
MR. PRAGER: In the Louis Vuitton 130 case, there’s no
commentary on Louis Vuitton. 131
PROF. BEEBE: Maybe you’re right.
PROF. HANSEN: Parody is not commentary. It’s making fun
of something. But that is the literary definition and it has changed
somewhat recently in the copyright infringement context. Parody
has become a doctrinal box which is helpful for defendants to be
in. Put someone in it; they are going to get the credit to be creative
and elites love that. Courts are willing to stretch that box for
defendants they want to help. So judges can make the box bigger
125

Id. The court cites to the Louis Vuitton case’s discussion on parody in finding that
“the evidence is insufficient to establish Defendant’s intent to create an unlawful
association with its famous mark . . . .” Id.
126
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 256 (4th
Cir. 2007)).
127
Id.
128
Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga., 2008).
129
Id. at 1309.
130
Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 252.
131
The court, however, found that Chewy Vuiton is “a comment on the rich and
famous, on the LOUIS VUITTON name and related marks, and on conspicuous
consumption in general.” Id. at 261.
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or smaller, depending on whether they like parody or they don’t,
whether they like commentary or don’t like it.
Courts so far have not liked parody defenses when the use is
considered pornographic. I don’t think I have seen such a case in
which the defendant won. In Pillsbury, 132 Screw Magazine came
close to winning. The district court held that pornographic
depiction in the magazine of the the Pillbury Doughboy was a fair
use. Moreover, the court held the depiction created no likelihood
of confusion under trademark law. 133 Almost home, but then the
court held that the depiction violated Georgia antidiultion
statute. 134
I think it’s in the eye of the beholder.
MR. MCCOOE: We represent Yellow Tail, the wine company,
which is arguably a famous mark. It’s the most popular wine the
United States has ever seen. Larry Flynt is one of the great
parodists of our time and great humorists. He had an ad—I don’t
know if he concocted it—an ad of an Asian woman, naked, with a
yellow tail. We had to write a letter to Larry Flynt about it. You
would expect that at least they would respond. No. His attitude is,
“You know what? Sue me. I don’t care. I’ve been shot. I’ve
been dragged through court. Sue me.”
You had to talk to your friends in Australia and say, “You
know, no one reads it anyway.”
PROF. HANSEN: You should have said you are going to give
up your subscription to Hustler. That might have gotten their
attention.
MR. MCCOOE: I don’t recall how we learned about this ad.
PROF. HANSEN: Anyone else?
QUESTION: So it sounds as though at least two of you—

132

Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., Civ. No. C78-679A, 1981 WL 1402
(N.D.Ga. Dec. 24, 1981).
133
Id. at *13 (stating that there was no likelihood of confusion when defendant used
plaintiff’s trademark figures in their advertisement).
134
Id. at *14 (“The court concludes that . . . there is a likelihood that the defendants’
presentation could injure the business reputation of the plaintiff or dilute the distinctive
quality of its trademarks.”).

VOL19_BOOK4_TRADEMARK PANEL

2009]

TRADEMARK: EFFECTS OF DILUTION

11/16/2009 6:47:06 AM

1071

PROF. HANSEN: Name?
QUESTIONER: Susan Scafidi.
PROF. HANSEN: Affiliation?
QUESTIONER: I’ve been in law school for a decade and a
half. But it’s currently Fordham.
PROF. HANSEN: Your best friend on the faculty?
QUESTIONER: Does it even need to be asked?
It sounds as though at least two of you are ready to throw out
dilution altogether today, if you had your way. But I want to come
back to Professor Hansen’s comments at the beginning about why
dilution was even written into U.S. law and ask the broader
question: are there reasons to keep it? It has been suggested that
it’s useful in the C&D context. It may be useful, perhaps, in a
pedagogical way, to keep people from infringing, even though
there are very few wrongs that can’t be righted in other words,
without this particular Act.
Then there is also, of course, the international context. Think
of emerging economies in particular, the BRIC countries, Brazil,
Russia, India, China, where you might have a mark that is famous
elsewhere, and even in that country, registered, but not in use yet,
and another very similar mark registered.
Is there not use in those other contexts? Is there not reason
along those lines, or perhaps along other lines that I haven’t
thought of, for keeping dilution in the U.S. law nonetheless?
MR. PRAGER: I think so. I’m a fan of dilution. I just think
that the tests that have been made available for measuring it are
poor. But as a principle, I think there is brand equity that deserves
protection, even in the absence of confusion, for some brands. I
think it’s a disservice to people who invest in building brand equity
not to give them some protection for that.
I would just like to see a more principled way of assessing
whether there has been dilution.
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PROF. BEEBE: Going back to that theme, remember, the V
Secret case remanded back to the district court. 135 The district
court found all six factors under blurring to favor the plaintiff—in
other words, to favor a finding of blurring. 136 Then the district
court said, “There’s no blurring.” 137
That’s a little follow-up on that point.
I think Hugh had it right, as usual, when he said that
misappropriation was sort of the underlying theme of all of this
stuff. Bad-faith actors—the court is going to find a way to reach
them. If the court can’t through confusion, then dilution is flexible
enough and they will reach them that way.
That strikes me as a reasonable justification. I might be
somewhat hostile to dilution because of the parody cases and the
First Amendment aspects of dilution. But going to your blog,
counterfeitchic.com, 138 I think dilution makes a lot of sense if you
are a luxury goods manufacturer. If you manufacture luxury
brands and then attach those brands to various things of one kind
or another, then you must maintain the distinctiveness of your
mark, the uniqueness of your mark, its reputation for exclusivity.
It makes complete sense that you would bring anti-dilution causes
of action against people who are parodying your mark or copying
it just slightly, but in such a way that no one is going to actually be
confused into thinking that plastic watch is coming from Rolex or
something like that.
The reason I would see parody, or at least some sort of
commentary, in Chewy Vuitton is that if you are hostile to that
version of consumer society, then your politics should lead you to
be hostile to antidilution protection, because it’s shoring up that
whole world of conspicuous consumption and zero-sum arms-race
consumption, people spending money on labels. There is a lot of
political stuff underneath, I think, the cause of action.

135
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (“The judgment is
therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.”).
136
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 749 (W.D. Ky. 2008).
137
Id.
138
Counterfeit Chic, http://www.counterfeitchic.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
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PROF. HANSEN: Where did you get your tie?
PROF. BEEBE: I got it at Filene’s Basement.
QUESTIONER: What’s the label?
PROF. BEEBE: The brand has been taken off.
PROF. HANSEN: Anyone else, thoughts, comments?
QUESTION: I’m Britton Payne. I’m with Foley & Lardner.
I’m a graduate of Fordham Law, former student of Professor
Hansen, former associate of Eric Prager, and former publisher of
Barton Beebe. Dennis, it’s nice to meet you.
PROF. HANSEN: I think that’s all the time we have.
QUESTIONER: Going forward and offering advice to clients,
particularly in an economic environment where they are looking to
cut costs, unless there is a really clear-cut case that there is dilution
and no confusion, as in the Hershey bar van case, should we really
just be giving perfunctory attention to claims of dilution, just sort
of tacking them onto the end and really leaving them there? Or is
that still no further protection than not putting them in at all?
You were talking about how expensive it is to be able to show
dilution.
MR. MCCOOE: I’m not a big fan of garbage complaints. It
annoys the heck out of me.
QUESTIONER: I’m just talking about the additional claim.
MR. MCCOOE: I know, and that’s what I’m talking about,
larding it with extra facts that prove nothing and have nothing to
do with the case, adding causes of action that have no substantive
remedy, talking about common-law unfair competition when you
already have a federal cause of action that is going to cover you, or
you are not covered at all. I think it confuses things. Obviously,
people raise defenses all the time—if you go through the
affirmative defenses, half of them don’t apply. But people are of
the mind that “my insurance company wants me to put them in.”
It’s not going to go away. It’s up to the judges to decide that
they are not going to listen to that cause of action, because they
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know the law well enough. Hopefully your mediation statement or
your arbitration statement or your settlement position paper will
explain why it’s a nonsense cause of action in this particular case.
Maybe they can make out dilution, but there is no confusion in
the van case. I don’t know if they had a lawyer. That was the first
thought that came to mind when I looked at the Hershey—
MR. PRAGER: They didn’t in the opinion. They appeared not
to.
MR. MCCOOE: It’s a strange thing. I look at that and I see
that it would be a problem. I would advise them that they might
run afoul of a big company like Hershey that is an American
legend. People love it. You don’t want to attack them. You can
attack Larry Flynt, but don’t attack Hershey. It was a bad decision,
just because of who they chose to use as their inspiration.
I don’t know what the lesson is there, other than that you
should probably consult with a lawyer, especially before you do it
for an important mark, such as the name of your company or your
principal brand image.
If it was just Charbucks—my thought on that—if it was just
one of the brands or one of the varietals that they sold in the store,
Starbucks wouldn’t have bothered them.
PROF. HANSEN: Anyone else?
QUESTION: Charlie Chan (phonetic). I’m a solo practitioner.
Just as a follow-up to the question raised earlier regarding a
foreign famous mark, would any one of you care to comment on
the prospect of protection of foreign famous marks in this country?
PROF. BEEBE: That’s a whole other kettle of fish.
PROF. HANSEN: That is a whole other kettle of fish.
Interestingly enough, New York State courts are probably the best
place to sue for protection of an international famous mark. The
Second Circuit just went through this with a certified question to
the New York Court of Appeals which said, basically, “It doesn’t
even have to be famous. If there is some sort of misappropriation
or some sort of unfair competition or use of goodwilll of the mark
found here we will prevent that use. It doesn’t matter whether the
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mark is here now or not.” They cited previous New York law such
as case involving the French restaurant Maxim’s. 139
MR. PRAGER: Under dilution law, you don’t get protection.
It’s not available. But there is a “well-known marks” doctrine. It’s
not famousness per se. It’s a “well-known marks” doctrine that
sometimes gives you protection, depending on what state you are
in.
PROF. HANSEN: I think, actually, strangely, this country is
hostile to it. The Federal Circuit is hostile to it. The PTO is
hostile to it.
MR. MCCOOE: It doesn’t affect U.S. commerce, is the theory.
In theory, it’s not affecting U.S. commerce.
PROF. HANSEN: But we are supposed to be giving that
protection to well-known or famous marks who are not yet in use
in this country through the Paris Convention, et al., and we expect
this protection to be given to our marks in other countries such as
the McDonalds case in South Africa.
MR. PRAGER: There hasn’t been implementing legislation.
PROF. HANSEN: No, not much but there is enough to work
with that we could do better, I think.
Any final comments from the panel on anything?
(No response)
Thank you panel and thank you audience for such an enjoyable
and interesting session.
MR. CAREY: I just want to thank Professor Hansen and the
trademark panel for their insightful treatment of the doctrine of
dilution and for yet another great contribution to the scholarship of
the IPLJ.
It has been a wonderful Symposium for us today. I have never
wanted to eat a Hershey bar and move furniture as much as I have
for the last hour or so. Thank you very much for that.

139
Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd. v. Quality King Disribs., Inc., 832 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir.
1987).
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I don’t want to add too much to what has been said already, but
in the spirit of the Thanksgiving season, I do want to reiterate some
of my thanks from this morning.
First of all, I would like to thank you all who have been here
with us throughout the day for your questions and for participating
in the discussion. I’m sure we have helped resolve all the issues
discussed here affirmatively for you all going forward.
I would like to thank all of our panelists—not just our
trademark panelists, but our patent panelists and our copyright
panelists from earlier in the day—for traveling and all the effort
they put into preparation for our Symposium. Thank you so
kindly.
Again, I would like to thank Fordham Law’s Office of Public
Programming for their assistance in helping to plan the
Symposium.
I would also like to again thank the Fordham faculty, our own
moderator, Professor Patterson, for his remarks this morning, and
our hometown hero, Professor Hugh Hansen, my left-hand man at
present, for his help in being instrumental in assisting us with the
Symposium.
I would like to recognize the IPLJ staff and edit board for their
work behind the scenes today. Finally, I would like once again to
recognize our Symposium Editor, Mr. Anthony Rizzo, for his
tremendous work.
Thank you all very much. We’ll be having cocktails in the
Atrium outside. Come again next year.
PROF. HANSEN: Also the IPLJ is an excellent journal to send
your articles to. It ranks up there, in all the different rankings of IP
journals. So you should really consider it in your future plans if
you are writing.
MR. CAREY: Thank you.

